A key challenge in dynamic information flow analysis is handling implicit flows, where code conditional on a private variable updates a public variable x. The naive approach of upgrading x to private results in x being partially leaked, where its value contains private data but its label might remain public on an alternative execution (where the conditional update was not performed). Prior work proposed the no-sensitive-upgrade check, which handles implicit flows by prohibiting partially leaked data, but attempts to update a public variable from a private context causes execution to get stuck.
INTRODUCTION
JavaScript has become the dominant language for clientside web development. Once relegated to form validation and similar small tasks, JavaScript today has become a major component of the Web 2.0 architecture; applications such as Google Maps and Gmail rely on it heavily to give online applications the interactive features previously limited to the realm of desktop applications. Browser vendors have spent a good deal of effort on their JavaScript implementations, so that recent versions have become tremendously fast [17] .
But as JavaScript's role has grown, its security vulnerabilities have become more significant. Most prominently, cross-site scripting (XSS) has become one of the most pervasive computer security vulnerabilities. Mashups [26] , where code is combined from multiple sites, are particularly problematic, and yet they are very popular. In response, a wide array of security mechanisms have been put in place. The same origin policy [29] is one of the oldest, beginning with early versions of Netscape. It prevents scripts from accessing documents from other domains, but it does very little to control the interaction of scripts loaded in the same page. To give developers greater freedom, Mozilla developed a system for signed scripts [28] and Internet Explorer created Security Zones [27] . Unfortunately, the permissions granted by these two systems have little overlap, making developing secure applications that function correctly across all browsers extremely difficult. Other strategies have involved limiting JavaScript to only a subset of language features; this is the approach taken by Facebook with FBJS [15] and Google with Caja [18] . This list covers only a portion of the total security mechanisms focused on JavaScript and the browser.
The error-prone nature of software systems suggests that critical security policies are best enforced by small trusted modules, rather than being an emergent property of complex and buggy application code. Just as memory-safe languages provide a resilient defense against buffer-overrun vulnerabilities, violations of privacy or data integrity expectations need a similar systemic solution. While these concerns apply to a wide variety of programs, they are particularly relevant in a browser setting where code fragments from multiple untrusted or semi-trusted servers execute within the same process.
Information flow analysis is a compelling option for solving these issues. It gives a stronger guarantee that confidentiality and integrity are protected, while being arguably less restrictive than some measures currently being used. Much prior work has focused on providing information flow security guarantees via type-based static analyses [41, 20, 8, 42, 31] . In general, static analyses are often preferred for their advantages in performance and because of their ability to reason about all paths of execution. Unfortunately, typebased static analyses are not applicable to browser-based applications written in JavaScript, which is a dynamically typed language. Therefore our work focuses on enforcing information flow policies dynamically rather than statically. Previous work has addressed some of the performance concerns of dynamic analysis [4] , but verifying information flow properties via a purely dynamic analysis is rather tricky. The central correctness property that we wish to enforce is termination-insensitive non-interference, which says that changing the private inputs to an application should not influence any of the public outputs.
1 Verifying this property dynamically requires simultaneously reasoning about the current actual execution of the program, as well as possible alternate executions of the program on the same public inputs but different private inputs.
Dynamic analysis can reason precisely about the actual execution, but simultaneously reasoning about possible alternate executions is rather difficult, particularly when the alternate execution could execute different code and update different memory locations than the actual execution. A particular challenge is handling implicit flows, when code whose execution is conditional on private information updates a public variable.
The code fragment in Figure 1 captures the essence of this difficulty in a simple example. This code defines a function f that takes a private boolean argument x, initializes two public variables y and z to true, and then conditionally updates both of these variables before returning z. Thus, information flows from the private argument variable x into y and then into z, and the challenge is to track this information flow dynamically so that z is also labeled as private. The security label H denotes private or high confidentiality data, and conversely L denotes public or low confidentiality data. Tracking the information flow due to a conditional assignment that does not happen is particularly difficult, as we discuss below.
Naive. An intuitive (but ineffective) strategy for handling the first conditional assignment to y is to upgrade the label on y to H, since that assignment is conditional on the private variable x. In the case where x is true H then y becomes false H , and is appropriately labeled private; however, if x is false H then y remains true L and is still labeled public. Thus, we say that the variable y is partially leaked, since y now contains private information but y is labeled private on only one of these two executions.
Continuing the example, we now perform a second conditional assignment to z, which is initially true L . The result of these two conditionals is that z is labeled public, but contains the value of the private input x. That is, if x is true H then y becomes false H and z remains true L ; conversely, if x is false H then y remains true L and so z becomes false L . Thus, the naive approach to handling implicit flows permits both partially leaked data (in y) and totally leaked data (in z), and fails to provide terminationinsensitive non-interference.
No-Sensitive-Upgrade. The above intuitive approach of simply upgrading the security label of the conditionally assigned variable is inadequate. A proposed solution uses the no-sensitive-upgrade check [42, 4] , whereby execution will fail-stop or get stuck whenever data would be partially leaked. Under this strategy, the assignment to the public variable y from code conditional on a private variable x would get stuck.
Although this strategy satisfies termination-insensitive noninterference, it also rejects valid programs that have no information leak. To illustrate this limitation, consider the following code snippet where the input x is private: var y = false; if (x) { y = true; } return true;
Although no information leak occurs, this program gets stuck under the no-sensitive-upgrade approach (and would also be rejected by many static analyses).
Permissive-Upgrade. The goal of this paper is to allow more applications to run to completion than under the no-sensitive-upgrade check, while still providing information flow security guarantees.
Our proposed permissive-upgrade strategy tolerates and carefully tracks partially leaked data, while still providing termination-insensitive non-interference. The central idea is to introduce an additional label P to identify and track partially leaked data:
The security label P identifies partially leaked data that contains private information but which may be labeled as public in some alternative executions.
Thus, at the conditional assignment to y in Figure 1 , if x is false H then y remains true L , as the assignment is not performed. If x is true H , however, then y is updated to false P , where the label P reflects that in other executions y may remain labeled public.
Such partially leaked data must be handled quite delicately. In particular, if y is ever used in a conditional branch, as in the second conditional of Figure 1 , then the permissiveupgrade strategy still gets stuck in order to avoid converting a partial information leak into a total information leak.
To avoid getting stuck in this situation, the conditional test expression y can be labeled as private before the conditional test, as shown in Figure 2 . This privatization operation H y converts both public (L) and partially leaked (P ) data to private (H). Critically, converting partially leaked data to private is sound since, as a consequence of the labeling operation, the resulting data is made private on all executions, including alternative executions where y was originally labeled public. Thus, we can avoid stuck executions simply by inserting privatization operations at all sensitive uses of partially leaked data. Sensitive uses include conditional branches, as described above, but also other operations such as indirect jumps, virtual method calls, etc. Once all the necessary privatization operations are in place, program execution will never fail-stop (although it may diverge). Any results returned will be labeled in a way that accounts for any influence from private data, including via implicit flows.
Privatization Inference. Finding all of these sensitive use points manually, however, can be an onerous task. This overhead is problematic since convincing developers to adopt different security tools is always something of a challenge. Especially when extra work is required, resistance to adoption can be fierce.
Fortunately, we can extend the permissive-upgrade semantics to minimize the burden placed on developers. Whenever a program would get stuck based on a sensitive use of partially leaked data, the runtime engine can infer the needed privatization operations. Over time, these privatization operations will improve the precision of the analysis, rejecting fewer program executions.
We present an extension of our permissive-upgrade evaluation semantics that also infers these privatization operations. In situations where our original semantics would get stuck because of a sensitive use of partially leaked data, the extended semantics automatically inserts the appropriate privatization operation instead, and so continues execution. Thus, the conditional test "if (y)" is automatically converted to "if ( H y)".
In practice, we envision that these techniques could be applied as follows: A JavaScript web application is initially released in an instrumented form that uses the extended semantics to infer the needed privatization operations. This semantics never gets stuck but does not (yet) provide information flow guarantees. After a certain period of testing, most privatization operations will be determined, and the appropriately modified application could be re-released under the permissive-upgrade semantics with strong informationflow guarantees. Subsequently, some executions may still get stuck, but these are likely to be few, and can immediately be used to update the privatization operations for the application, preventing subsequent executions from getting stuck at the same sensitive operation. In this manner, the difficulty of inferring the correct privatization operations can be amortized over a large collection of users.
We hope that these inference techniques may help migrate existing Javascript web applications into a more secure world, where information flow policies are tracked and enforced by the language runtime itself. This deployment strategy requires information-flow support in the browser's JavaScript implementation, and we are exploring how to incorporate such extensions in the Firefox browser [14] .
A CORE LANGUAGE FOR INFORMATION FLOW
We formalize our permissive-upgrade strategy in terms of λ info , an imperative extension of the lambda calculus described in Figure 3 . The lambda calculus has a rich tradition as a foundational test-bed for research in programming languages and type theory, and we believe that it is an equally effective platform for investigating information flow security.
Terms include variables (x), constants (c), functions (λx.e), and function application (e1 e2). Constants include integers as well as primitive operations such as "+". Since many of the challenges in information flow analysis come from imperative updates, our language supports mutable reference cells, including terms for allocating (ref e), dereferencing (!e), and updating (e1:= e2) a reference cell. Finally, there is a term for labeling data as private ( H e). λ info is much simpler than JavaScript, allowing us to reason more easily about some of the challenges involved in correctly handling implicit flows. Although exceptions add important additional complexities to implicit flows [2, 23] , we leave them for future work.
Many additional constructs can be built from this core language; the second part of Figure 3 sketches some standard encodings for booleans, conditionals, let-expressions, and sequential composition.
As an illustrative example of λ info , Figure 4 translates the 
THREE EVALUATION STRATEGIES
We next formalize the permissive-upgrade evaluation strategy for the idealized language λ info . For completeness, we also formalize the two other evaluation strategies (naive and no-sensitive-upgrade) discussed in the introduction. Figure 5 presents the core semantics that is common to all evaluation strategies.
The semantics includes both public (L) and private (H) labels, as well as the partially leaked label (P ), which is used exclusively by the permissive-upgrade semantics. In a more general setting with multiple principals, each security label would have the type Principal → {L, H, P } .
Our approach extends to this more general setting, but for clarity of exposition we present our ideas in a simpler setting with just a single principal and a three element label lattice. Labels are ordered by L H P reflecting the constraints on how correspondingly labeled data is used, noting that partially leaked data must be handled in a more restrictive manner than private data. We use to denote the corresponding join operation on labels. Critically, because P is more restrictive than H, H P = P .
In the evaluation semantics, each reference cell is allocated at an address a. A store σ maps addresses to values. A raw value r is either a constant (c), an address (a), or a closure (λx.e, θ), which is a pair of a λ-expression and a substitution θ that maps variables to values. A value v has the form r k , which combines both an information flow label k ∈ {L, H, P } and a raw value r. We use ∅ to denote both the empty store and the empty substitution. Figure 5 defines the semantics of λ info via the big-step evaluation relation:
This relation evaluates an expression e in the context of a store σ, a substitution θ, and the current label pc of the program counter, and returns the resulting value v and the (possibly modified) store σ . The program counter label pc ∈ {L, H} reflects whether the execution of the current code is conditional on private data.
The rules defining this evaluation relation are straightforward, with some notable subtleties on how labels are handled. In particular, we adopt the invariant that the label on the resulting value v is at least as secret as the program counter (pc label (v)). Thus, for example, the [const] rule evaluates a const c to the labeled value c pc . The [fun] rule evaluates a function (λx.e) to a closure (λx.e, θ)
pc that captures the current substitution and that includes the program counter label. The [var] rule for a variable reference x extracts the corresponding value θ(x) from the environment and strengthens its label to be at least pc, using the following overloading of the join operator:
The [app] rule applies a closure to an argument; to avoid information leaks, this rule gets stuck if the closure is partially leaked. The [prim] rule applies function primitives.
The [ref] and [deref] rules create and dereference a reference cell, respectively. The [label] rule for H e explicitly tags the result of evaluating e as private, ignoring the original label k. This rule can be used either to upgrade public data or downgrade partially leaked data. Note that the latter case is safe, since the data will be made private on the current execution as well as any alternate execution.
From these rules, we can derive corresponding evaluation rules for the encoded constructs, which are also shown in Figure 5 . Critically, the [then] and [else] rules get stuck if the conditional is partially leaked. σ, θ, x ⇓pc σ, (θ(x) pc) [app] σ, θ, e1 ⇓pc σ1, (λx.e, θ )
σ, θ, (λx.e) ⇓pc σ, (λx.e, θ)
σ, θ, e ⇓pc σ , r k σ, θ, H e ⇓pc σ , r
σ, θ, e ⇓pc σ , a k σ, θ, !e ⇓pc σ , (σ (a) k) Derived Evaluation Rules: [then] σ, θ, e1 ⇓pc σ1, (true, θ)
σ, θ, e1 ⇓pc σ1, v1 σ1, θ, e2 ⇓pc σ , v σ, θ, (e1; e2) ⇓pc σ , v Below, we formalize the three strategies for tracking implicit flows as three different rules for evaluating assignment statements.
We also illustrate these strategies on the example function f(x) shown in Figure 4 . In the situation where the argument x is false H , all three evaluation strategies return false L . The following subsections describe how different strategies handle the tricky case where x is true H and where f must update the public reference cell y.
The Naive Approach
The intuitive approach for assignment is to promote the label on the reference cell to at least the label k on the address a k . (Note that a global evaluation invariant ensures that pc k.)
For the function call f(true H ), this strategy updates y to false H but leaves z as true L . Thus, by comparing the return value for the All strategies and Naive column of Figure 1 , we see that the result of f(x) is a publicly labeled copy of its private argument, and so this naive approach leaks information.
The No-Sensitive-Upgrade Approach
The no-sensitive-upgrade (NSU) approach avoids information leaks by getting stuck if a public reference cell is updated when the pc is private, or when the label on the target address is private. (In an implementation such stuck states might cause an exception to be thrown to the top level.)
The following rule requires that the label k on the target address a k is at most the label on the reference cell contents. This rule assumes all data is labeled public or private, but never partially leaked.
For our example function, the call f(true H ) would get stuck on the update to the public variable y within a private branch of execution, as illustrated by the NSU column of Figure 1 , preventing the information leak.
Unfortunately, the NSU strategy may also get stuck on code that does not leak information, as shown in Figure 6 . Although there is no information leak, evaluation of g(true H ) gets stuck when the private parameter x is partially leaked. Thus, the NSU strategy satisfies termination-insensitive noninterference, but is unnecessarily restrictive.
The Permissive-Upgrade Approach
The permissive-upgrade semantics introduces an additional label (P ) in order to tolerate and track partially leaked data. This strategy allows us to defer the point of failure and reduce the number of false positives.
The rule [assign-permissive] below considers an assignment to an address a k that currently holds a value labeled l. The rule requires that the address is not partially leaked (k = P ).
The rule uses the following function lift(k, l) to infer the new label m for the reference cell.
We consider each possible combination of labels k and l:
• If the target address is public (k = L), then execution is not in a private context (due to the evaluation invariant that pc k). In this situation there are no difficulties with implicit flows, so m = L.
• Conversely, if the target address or execution context is private (k = H), then an attempt to update a public reference cell (l = L) results in the new contents being labeled as partially leaked (m = P ).
• Updating a private cell from a private context is fine, and results in a private cell.
• Finally, updating a partially leaked cell from a private context leaves the cell as partially leaked.
For the function call f(true H ) from Figure 1 , the permissiveupgrade strategy handles the first conditional assignment by marking y as partially leaked, but gets stuck on the second conditional test, to avoid information leaks.
We can remedy this situation by introducing the label H :
if ( H !y) then z := false;
This privatization operation ensures the test expression is private on both executions, rather than partially leaked on one execution and public on the other. The modified function f now runs to completion on all boolean inputs. Section 5 discusses how to infer these privatization operations automatically. Figure 6 demonstrates that, under the permissive-upgrade strategy, the function g runs to completion on all boolean inputs (unlike under NSU). More generally, the following theorem shows that any execution that does not get stuck under NSU evaluation (denoted ⇓ nu pc ) will also not get stuck under permissive-upgrade evaluation (denoted ⇓pc). Thus, the permissive-upgrade strategy is strictly superior to NSU. For the proof of this theorem, we refer the interested reader to a related technical report [5] . Theorem 1. Suppose σ, θ, and pc do not contain the partially leaked label P and σ, θ, e ⇓ nu pc σ , v. Then σ, θ, e ⇓pc σ , v, and σ and v do not contain P .
Partially leaked data must be handled carefully, since on an alternative execution this data might be labeled as public. In particular, function calls, conditionals, and assignments are considered sensitive operations; these operations get stuck (via the antecedent k = P ) if applied to partially leaked data (as otherwise our information flow analysis could not track how alternative executions may propagate partially leaked information). These stuck sensitive operations are critical for avoiding information leaks, and they distinguish the permissive-upgrade approach from the unsound naive approach.
To motivate why assignment statements are sensitive operations, consider the function h(x) shown in Figure 7 . This function allocates two reference cells y and z, initializes w as a pointer to y, and then, depending on the private argument x, conditionally updates w to point to z. At this stage, w is partially leaked, since whether it points to y or z depends on the input argument x. Updating the reference cell pointed to by w would result in totally leaked data, and must be precluded by the evaluation getting stuck at the indirect assignment (!w) := false as shown in the third column of Figure 7 .
The right hand side of Figure 7 illustrates how privatization operations overcome this limitation. The new function h_priv is identical to h, except that it makes the target address private before the assignment, as in:
( H !w) := false which allows this function to complete without information leaks. In particular, the revised assignment now updates y to false P , and so the return value is marked as partially leaked.
TERMINATION-INSENSITIVE NON-INTERFERENCE
We now verify that the permissive-upgrade strategy guarantees termination-insensitive non-interference.
Traditional non-interference arguments are based on an equivalence relation between labeled values that considers privately labeled values to be equivalent, even if the underlying raw values differ. The introduction of partially leaked data complicates this equivalence relation, since true L and false P are equivalent, as are false P and false L , since in each case the label P correctly identifies private data that is partially leaked. However, true L and false L are not equivalent, and so our desired "equivalence" relation does not satisfy transitivity.
Instead, we call this relation compatibility (∼). Intuitively, two stores are compatible if they differ only on private data, and executions that start with compatible stores should yield compatible results. In more detail, we define the compatibility relation (∼) on labels, values, substitutions, and stores as follows.
• Two labels are compatible if both are private or one is partially leaked:
• Two values are compatible if either their labels are compatible or the labels are identical and the raw values are compatible.
• Two raw values are compatible if they are identical or they are both closures with identical code and compatible substitutions:
• Two substitutions are compatible (written θ1 ∼ θ2) if they have the same domain and compatible values:
• Two stores σ1 and σ2 are compatible (written σ1 ∼ σ2) if they are compatible at all common addresses:
We also introduce an evolution (or can evolve to) relation (;) that constrains how evaluation with a private program counter can update the store. This relation composes in a transitive manner with compatibility: see Lemma 6 below.
• Label k1 can evolve to k2 if both labels are private or k2 is partially leaked:
2 if either the two values are equal or k1 can evolve to k2:
• A store σ1 can evolve to σ2 if every value in σ1 can evolve to the corresponding value in σ2: Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the derivation of σ, θ, e ⇓H σ , v and by case analysis on the final rule in the derivation.
•
• • [ref] : σ and σ agree on their common domain.
• [assign-permissive]: In this case, e = (e1:= e2) and we have:
By induction, σ ; σ1 ; σ2. By Lemma 2 below, l ; m. Hence σ2(a) ; (v m) and so σ2 ; σ .
In order to prove Lemma 1, we note some important properties of the ; relation. The evolution relation is transitive, and it is reflexive for both values and stores. The evolution relation on values interacts in a "transitive" manner with the compatibility relation.
If two stores are compatible (σ1 ∼ σ2), then evolution of one store (σ2 ; σ3) results in a new store that is compatible to the original stores (σ1 ∼ σ3), with the caveat that any newly allocated address must not be in the original stores.
Lemma 6 (Evolution Preserves Compatibility of Stores
. This means that ∀a ∈ D. σ1 (a) ∼ σ2 (a) and σ2 (a) ; σ3 (a). Therefore, by Lemma 5:
Hence by the definition of the evolution relation, σ1 ∼ σ3.
Next, we first observe certain properties of labels. First, if two labels k1 and k2 are compatible, then joining any label to k1 will still maintain the compatibility relation.
Also, if two labels are compatible and are part of different values, those values will also be compatible.
In a secure context (H as the first argument to the lift function), all labels are compatible.
Finally, we prove our central result: if an expression e is executed twice from compatible stores and compatible substitutions, then both executions will yield compatible resulting stores and values. That is, private inputs never leak into public outputs.
Theorem 2 (Termination-Insensitive Non-Interference).
Suppose pc ∈ {L, H} and σ1 ∼ σ2 and θ1 ∼ θ2 and σi, θi, e ⇓pc σ i , vi for i ∈ 1, 2. Then σ 1 ∼ σ 2 and v1 ∼ v2.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation σ1, θ1, e ⇓pc σ 1 , v1 and case analysis on the last rule used in that derivation.
• [const] : Then e = c and σ 1 = σ1 ∼ σ2 = σ 2 and v1 = v2 = c pc .
• [var] : Then e = x and σ 1 = σ1 ∼ σ2 = σ 2 and v1 = (θ1(x) pc) ∼ (θ2(x) pc) = v2.
• [fun] : Then e = λx.e and σ 1 = σ1 ∼ σ2 = σ 2 and v1 = (λx.e , θ1) pc ∼ (λx.e , θ2) pc = v2.
• [label] : Then e = H e . From the antecedent of this rule, we have that for i ∈ 1, 2:
σi, θi, e ⇓pc σ i , r
By induction, σ 1 ∼ σ 2 . Also, regardless of the raw values r1 and r2, r
by the definition of the compatibility relation.
• [app] : In this case, e = (ea e b ), and from the antecedents of this rule, we have that for i ∈ 1, 2:
σi, θi, ea ⇓pc σ i , (λx.ei, θ i )
By induction:
-If k1 and k2 are both H then v1 ∼ v2, since they both have label at least H. By Lemma 1, σ i ; σ i . Without loss of generality, we assume that the two executions allocate reference cells from disjoint parts of the address space, 2 i.e.:
Under this assumption, by Lemma 6 σ 1 ∼ σ 2 . Applying Lemma 6 again gives σ 1 ∼ σ 2 . -Otherwise θ 1 ∼ θ 2 and e1 = e2 and k1 = k2.
By induction, σ 1 ∼ σ 2 and v 1 ∼ v 2 , and hence
• [prim] : In this case, e = (ea e b ), and from the antecedents of this rule, we have that for i ∈ 1, 2:
σi, θi, ea ⇓pc σ i , c
-If either k1 ∼ k2 or l1 ∼ l2, then by Lemma 7 k1 l1 ∼ k2 l2. Therefore, r
. -Otherwise, r1 = r2, since c1 = c2 and d1 = d2.
Also, k1 l1 = k2 l2. Therefore, r
• [ref] : In this case, e = ref e . Without loss of generality, we assume that both evaluations allocate at the same address a ∈ dom(σ1) ∪ dom(σ2), and so a pc = v1 = v2. From the antecedents of this rule, we have that for i ∈ 1, 2:
σi, θi, e ⇓pc σ i , v i σ i = σ i [a := v i ]
By induction, σ 1 ∼ σ 2 and v 1 ∼ v 2 , and so σ 1 ∼ σ 2 . 2 We refer the interested reader to [6] for an alternative proof argument that does use of this assumption, but which involves a more complicated compatibility relation on stores.
• [deref] : In this case, e = !e , and from the antecedents of this rule, we have that for i ∈ 1, 2:
σi, θi, e ⇓pc σ i , a
By induction, σ 1 ∼ σ 2 and a
2 .
-Suppose a
2 . Then a1 = a2 and k1 = k2 and σ 1 (a1) ∼ σ 2 (a2), and so v1 ∼ v2.
-Suppose a 2 we must have that k1 ∼ k2 and hence v1 ∼ v2 from Lemma 8.
• [assign-permissive] In this case, e = (ea:= e b ), and from the antecedents of this rule, we have that for i ∈ 1, 2:
σi, θi, ea ⇓pc σ i , a By induction:
v1 ∼ v2 -If k1 ∼ k2 then k1 = k2 = H. By Lemma 9, m1 ∼ m2. By Lemma 8, (v1 m1) ∼ (v2 m2).
Hence σ 1 ∼ σ 2 .
-Otherwise k1 = k2 = L. Then m1 = m2 = L and hence σ 1 ∼ σ 2 .
PRIVATIZATION INFERENCE
The permissive-upgrade semantics guarantees terminationinsensitive non-interference while getting stuck on fewer programs than the NSU semantics, and it will not get stuck if the program includes privatization operations on sensitive uses of partially leaked data.
We now extend our semantics to infer these privatization operations. We begin by adding a position marker p ∈ Position on each sensitive operation (applications and assignments) where partially leaked data is not permitted.
e ::= . . . | (e1 e2) p | (e1:= e2) p Rather than explicitly insert privatization operations at particular positions in the source code, we instead extend the store σ to now also record the positions where these operations have been conceptually inserted. We replace the original [app] evaluation rule with three variants, and similarly for [assign-permissive] , as shown in Figure 8 . The [app-normal] rule applies if a privatization operation has not been inserted (p ∈ σ) and is not needed (k = P ). [app-upgrade] handles situations where the privatization operation has been inserted (p ∈ σ) by ignoring the label k on the closure and behaving as if the closure were labeled private instead. [app-infer] handles situations where a privatization operation is required (k = P ) but has not yet been inserted (p ∈ σ); it adds this position tag to the store (conceptually inserting the required privatization operation) and then reevaluates the application.
